Abstract
Experimental results are presented showing the effects of allowing real time revisions of voluntary contributions for the provision of a public good. Four public good payoff functions are examined, each of which generates specific equilibria. Evidence of increased provision of the public good is demonstrated for: (i) the case in which revisions are limited to increases and a provision point exists, and also (ii) when there is a high initial marginal return from the public good.
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The author wishes to express his appreciation for the reviews and comments made by James Cox, Mark Isaac, Vernon Smith, anonymous referees and participants at the Public Choice/ESA conference in San Francisco, April 1988. The author is also very grateful for the economic support of the Economic Science Laboratory at the University of Arizona.
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Dorsey, R.E. The voluntary contributions mechanism with real time revisions. Public Choice 73, 261–282 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00140922
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00140922