Abstract
This study examines the effects of alternative executive veto structures in a model of the budgetary process. For the model examined it is shown that the outcome of the budgetary process must be contained in the Pareto set if the executive has either no veto authority or the authority to exercise an all-or-nothing veto. When the executive has item veto authority, however, the outcome need not be contained in the Pareto set.
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The author is grateful for a faculty fellowship from the College of the Holy Cross and for financial assistance from the Procter and Gamble Fund which made this project possible. The comments of John R. Carter on an earlier version of this paper are also gratefully acknowledged. The author is solely responsible for the paper's final content.
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Schap, D. In search of efficacious executive veto authority. Public Choice 58, 247–257 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00155670
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00155670