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Gordon Tullock: Creative maverick of public choice

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Conclusion

Economics traditionally has been defined by both its methods and its subject matter. Tullock has been a creative maverick in developing and applying new models of interaction outside the traditional areas of market exchange. By using the tools of economic analysis in an exploratory and venturesome manner, he has openend new areas of inquiry. The debate about Tullock's contributions is important because it expands our understanding of the development of public choice and demonstrates Tullock's role in opening new areas of economic research.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Sweet Briar College, 24595, Sweet Briar, VA

    Gordon L. Brady

  2. Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, 22030, Fairfax, VA

    Robert D. Tollison

Authors
  1. Gordon L. Brady
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  2. Robert D. Tollison
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Additional information

We thank Charles Rowley for comments. The usual caveat applies. We also note that this paper forms part of a larger project to collect and edit the unpublished manuscripts of Gordon Tullock (of which there are many). Hopefully, this will result in a volume(s) along these lines in the near future.

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Brady, G.L., Tollison, R.D. Gordon Tullock: Creative maverick of public choice. Public Choice 71, 141–148 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00155733

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