Medieval origins of constitutional government in the West

Conclusions

This survey of the political history of nonwestern countries has shown that Russia, Japan, and China never developed the levels of constitutional government found in late medieval Europe. Three of the four social origins of constitutionalism in the West, rough balance between crown and noble, contractual-feudal military organization, and lordpeasant dynamics have been largely absent from these countries. Nor has any other substantial source (such as religion or economic organization) been uncovered that compensated for these absences or which otherwise fostered constitutionalism. Consequently, the major institutes of medieval constitutionalism, rural local government, autonomous towns, estates, and the rule of law, have also been largely absent. Village government, on the other hand, which was fostered in the West by the continuance of Germanic peasant organization and by the commune movement of the medieval period, has been found to be quite ubiquitous outside Europe. Village government existed — and in vital forms — in all three nonwestern regions, but always dwarfed by the power of authoritarian organs of the surrounding state structures. Thus, village government in and of itself lacked constitutional significance unless it was able to fuse with other, stronger constitutional institutions as it did in the West.

To avoid the charge that the present study is only another sentimentalization of remote, mythic past, the modern significance of medieval constitutionalism for liberal democracy must be established. Each component carried forth — and with essential continuity — one or more of the pivotal aspects of modern representative government, at least in those countries in which medieval constitutionalism was not destroyed by military-bureaucratic absolutism or by a labor-repressive commercialization of agriculture. Among those aspects of liberal democracy are citizenship rights, representative institutions, checks and balances on central authority, and the rule of law.

Rural local government contained representative government, from tribal popular assemblies to gentry cliques, which persisted in one form or another. Citizenship found its expression in participatory government and in the chartered liberties of village communes and frontier settlements. Local government in itself could not act as a check on central power; it could, however, provide a scattered but collectively almost insurmountable obstacle to state penetration of the localities. Towns provided various levels of citizenship and representation, from narrow oligarchy to representation of the guilds and plebeian classes. The progressiveness of “negative freedom” (freedom from feudal authority) enjoyed by lower classes is easily missed by focusing too narrowly on the oligarchic nature of many municipalities. To be rid of seigneurial controls and to have access to a more rational judiciary were benefits that were not lost on the urban masses streaming in from the countryside. Royal dependence on revenue from the towns served as a de facto check on central power inasmuch as infringing the rights of one endangered and unified the others.

The representative nature of the estates as well as their serving as checks and balances on the monarchy are very straightforward. The estates became the central arena of politics in successive centuries, and the struggle for citizenship rights was fought here in two senses. A main battle of liberalization was fought over the franchise, the right to vote and send representatives to the national assembly. Second, politics within the representative assembly often centered on extending freedoms and liberties by acts of legislation. The rule of law was a crown ornamenting and protecting medieval constitutionalism as well as liberal democracy. Law, that “brooding omnipresence in the sky” as Oliver Wendell Hohnes called it, served to guarantee citizenship rights, ensure proper consultation with the estates, and provide a normative and procedural grid in which the monarchal state had to act.

It is important to note once more that medieval constitutionalism was not almost democracy, nor was it sufficient cause of liberal democracy. It did, however, provide many of the critical components including representation, citizenship, checks and balances, and the rule of law, that were absent in other parts of the world. Nor was constitutional government always accompanied by trust, cooperation, and acceptance of the political status quo. Tension, conflict, and often open hostility were more the norm as monarchs endeavored to rid themselves of meddlesome pests. But their animosities were held in check by constitutional protections and the strength of the opposition. Monarchs could only bide their time, abide by the governing rules and practices, and await the opportunity to shed what they viewed as the fetters of antiquated politics.

The constitutional achievement, then, was a modest and frail one that had inherent instabilities owing to monarchal/state ambitions. It would be undermined in many countries where the commercialization of agriculture and the exigencies of modern warfare combined to bring about authoritarian relations and institutions. Elsewhere, where the impact of war and commercialization were less pronounced, medieval constitutionalism would serve as a basis for liberal democracy.