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Further remarks on Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem and the weak Pareto principle

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Abstract

Weak Pareto versions of Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem are established for mixture-preserving utility functions defined on a mixture set of alternatives.

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  1. Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, V6T 1Z1, Vancouver, B.C., Canada

    John A. Weymark

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  1. John A. Weymark
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Weymark, J.A. Further remarks on Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem and the weak Pareto principle. Soc Choice Welfare 12, 87–92 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182195

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182195

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