Skip to main content
Log in

Condorcet's jury theorem in light of de Finetti's theorem

Majority-rule voting with correlated votes

  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper generalizes Condorcet's jury theorem to the case of symmetrically dependent votes with the help of de Finetti's theorem. Thus, the paper relaxes Condorcet's assumption of independent voting while preserving his main result: In jury-type situations a majority of voters is more likely than any single voter to choose the better of two alternatives.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Berg S (1992) Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors. University of Lund, (unpublished)

  • Black D (1963) The theory of committees and elections. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Chow YS, Teicher H (1988) Probability theory: independence, interchangeability, martingales. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Clemen RT (1987) Combining overlapping information. Manag Sci 33: 373–380

    Google Scholar 

  • de Finetti B (1990) Theory of probability, vol 2. Wiley, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Dharmadhikari S, Joag-dev K (1988) Unimodality, convexity, and applications. Academic Press, San Diego, CA

    Google Scholar 

  • Enelow JM, Hinich MJ (1984) The spatial theory of voting: an introduction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Estlund DJ, Waldron J, Grofman B, Feld SL (1989) Democratic theory and public interest: Condorcet and Rousseau revisited. Am Polit Sci Rev 83: 1317–1340

    Google Scholar 

  • Feller W (1983) An introduction to probability theory and its applications, vol II. Wiley Eastern, New Delhi

    Google Scholar 

  • Fishburn PC, Vickson RG (1978) Theoretical foundations of stochastic dominance. In: Whitmore GA, Findlay MC (eds) Stochastic dominance. DC Health, Lexington, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Grofman B (1975) A comment on democratic theory: a preliminary model. Publ Choice 21: 100–103

    Google Scholar 

  • Grofman B, Feld SL (1988) Rousseau's general will: a condorcetian perspective. Am Polit Sci Rev 82: 567–576

    Google Scholar 

  • Grofman B, Owen G, Feld SL (1983) Thirteen theorems in search of the truth. Theory Decis 15: 261–278

    Google Scholar 

  • Kingdon J (1973) Congressmen's voting decisions. Harper, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Kreps DM (1988) Notes on the theory of choice. Westview, Boulder, CO

    Google Scholar 

  • Ladha KK (1992) The Condorcet jury theorem, free speech and correlated votes. Am J Polit Sci 36: 617–634

    Google Scholar 

  • Lindley D (1985) Reconciliation of discrete probability distributions. In: Bernado JM et al (eds) Bayesian statistics, vol 2. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp 375–390

    Google Scholar 

  • Matthews DR, Stimson JA (1975) Yeas and nays. Wiley, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • McKelvey RD, Ordeshook PC (1985) Elections with limited information: a fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources. J Econ Theory 36: 55–85

    Google Scholar 

  • McKelvey RD, Ordeshook PC (1986) Information, electoral equilibria, and the democratic ideal. J Polit 48: 909–937

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller NR (1986) Information, electorates, and democracy: some extensions and interpretations of the Condorcet jury theorem: In: Grofman B, Owen G (eds) Information pooling and group decision making. Jai, Greenwich, CT

    Google Scholar 

  • Nitzan S, Paroush J (1985) Collective decision making. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Panning WH (1986) Information pooling and group decisions in nonexperimental settings. In: Grofman B, Owen G (eds) Information pooling and group decision making, Jai, Greenwich, CT

    Google Scholar 

  • Owen G (1986) ‘Fair’ indirect majority rules. In: Grofman B, Owen G (eds) Information pooling and group decision making. Jai, Greenwich, CT

    Google Scholar 

  • Penrod S, Hastie R (1979) Models of jury decision making: a critical review. Psychol Bull 86: 462–492

    CAS  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Savage LJ (1972) The foundations of statistics. Dover, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Schofield N (1972) Is majority rule special. In: Niemi R, Weisberg H (eds) Probability models of collective decision making. Merrill, Columbus

    Google Scholar 

  • Shapley L, Grofman B (1984) Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies. Publ Choice 43: 329–343

    Google Scholar 

  • Winkler RL, Hays WL (1975) Statistics. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Young HP (1986) Optimal ranking and choice from pairwise comparisons. In: Grofman B, Owen G (eds) Information pooling and group decision making. Jai, Greenwich, CT

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

I am indebted to Professors Steven Brams, Arnold Buss, Gary Miller and Norman Schofield for their comments and questions. This paper is supported, in part, by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-9210800).

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Ladha, K.K. Condorcet's jury theorem in light of de Finetti's theorem. Soc Choice Welfare 10, 69–85 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00187434

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00187434

Keywords

Navigation