Abstract
This paper generalizes Condorcet's jury theorem to the case of symmetrically dependent votes with the help of de Finetti's theorem. Thus, the paper relaxes Condorcet's assumption of independent voting while preserving his main result: In jury-type situations a majority of voters is more likely than any single voter to choose the better of two alternatives.
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I am indebted to Professors Steven Brams, Arnold Buss, Gary Miller and Norman Schofield for their comments and questions. This paper is supported, in part, by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-9210800).
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Ladha, K.K. Condorcet's jury theorem in light of de Finetti's theorem. Soc Choice Welfare 10, 69–85 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00187434
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00187434