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One might fruitfully compare the Nyāya syllogism with Ryle's mongrel-categorical statements. Of these he says, “It is clear that such statements are not laws, for they mention particular things or persons. On the other hand they resemble laws in being partly ‘variable’ or ‘open’.” [Concept of Mind, p. 123].
See Barlingay, S. S., “A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic”, note 4, p. 111.
Ingalls, D. H. H. Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic, p. 28.
Athaleye and Bodas, Tarka Samgraha, p. 243.
Bochenski, I. M., A History of Formal Logic, p. 438.
The position of the Naiyāyikās indeed seems not unlike that of the Renaissance logician Peter Ramus. Prior informs us (“The Algebra of the Copula”, Studies in the Philosophy of C. S. Peirce, p. 85–6): “The Ramist s used the terms antecedents and consequence indifferently for subject and predicate, antecedent and consequent and premise (or premisses) and conclusion”. And later in history we know that Peirce adopted a similar position.
Bochenski, I. M., op. cit.A History of Formal Logic, p. 445.
Ibid. Bochenski, I. M., A History of Formal Logic, p. 442–43.
Ingalls, D. H. H., cop. cit.Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic, p. 63.
It is important to remember that Indian Logic was never completely dissociated from epistemology. Inference is always listed under the category of ‘valid means of knowledge’.
Again as in Plato we have suggestions of the ‘convenyance’ relation of Broad.
The distinction is indeed given recognition in the Buddhist concepts of ‘Svabhāvānumāna’ (inference through analysis) and ‘Kāryānumāna’ (inference from causes).
Ingalls, D. H. H. op. cit.Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic, p. 68.
cf. Athaleya and Bodas, op. cit. p. 246 referring to Nilaka\(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}\) \(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{t}\)ha's Tarka-Dīpika-Prakāśa.
cf. Lewis C. I. and Longford Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications for the theory of strict implication.
See Mates, B., Stoic Logic for an excellent discussion on Diodorus.
Ingalls, D. H. H., op. cit. Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic, p. 35.
Athaleye and Bodas, op. cit. Tarka Samgraha, p. 234.
Barlingay argues (op. cit.) Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic that the Nyāyá logicians used the hypothetical syllogism principle, but the latter is in fact a special case of inference for them.
Bibliography
Athaley, Y. V. and Bodas M. R. ed. Tarka Sa \(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m}\) graha of Anhambha \(\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{t} \underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{t}\) a, Bombay Sanskrit & Prakrit Series No. LV, 1963.
Barlingay, S. S. A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic, National Publishing House Delhi, 1965.
Bochenski, I. M., A History of Formal Logic, Notre Dame University Press, 1961.
Ingalls D. H. H. Materials for the Study of Navya Nyāya Logic, Harvard Oriental Series Vol. 40, Harvard University Press, 1951.
Lewis C. J. and Langford C. H., Symbolic Logic [New York], Dover Publications, 1959.
Mates, B. Stoic Logic University of California Press, 1961.
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Mullick, M. Implication and entailment in Navya-nyāya logic. J Indian Philos 4, 127–134 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00211110
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00211110