Abstract
A tournament is any complete asymmetric relation over a finite set A of outcomes describing pairwise comparisons. A choice correspondence assigns to every tournament on A a subset of winners. Miller's uncovered set is an example for which we propose an axiomatic characterization. The set of Copeland winners (outcomes with maximal scores) is another example; it is a subset of the uncovered set: we note that it can be a dominated subset. A third example is derived from the sophisticated agenda algorithm; we argue that it is a better choice correspondence than the Copeland set.
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Moulin, H. Choosing from a tournament. Soc Choice Welfare 3, 271–291 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00292732
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00292732