Abstract
Economic models of enforcing environmental law have incorporated varying assumptions about regulatory objectives. This paper examines the consequences of different attitudes toward the benefits and costs of pollution control on the part of regulators who have limited powers and resources. We find that greater weight given to compliance costs relative to the social damages of the polluting activity will bring outcomes closer to the optimum when the regulator is strong, but may move outcome further from the social optimum when regulatory powers are weak. When negotiated noncompliance is an option, greater consideration of compliance costs will tend to produce better results.
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The author thanks Jon Harford, Mitch Renkow, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1993 AERE Summer Meeting.
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Keeler, A.G. Regulatory objectives and enforcement behavior. Environ Resource Econ 6, 73–85 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00691412
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00691412