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Thanks to Nathaniel Beck, Leonard Binder, Gary Cox, James DeNardo, Shale Horowitz, Gary Jacobson, Shefali Jha, Sam Kernell, Mathew McCubbins, Gary Miller, John Mulcaire, Douglass North, Peter Ordeshook, Ronald Rogowski, Norman Schoefield, George Tsebelis, Gordon Tullock, Michael Wallerstein, and Barry Weingast for comments on ancestral versions over the years. Research supported by NSF grant SES 8896228 and UCLA Senate grants.
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Schwartz, T. Representation as agency and the Pork Barrel Paradox. Public Choice 78, 3–21 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053363
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053363