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Freiherr Karl Friedrich Hyronymus von Münchhausen (1720–91), renowned German braggart (‘The Baron of Lies’), once told the story that during fighting in Russia he went astray with his horse into a swamp. In acute danger he rescued himself from sinking into mud by grabbing his tuft and pulling himself out. (Raspe, 1785; Bürger, 1786).
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Leininger, W. More efficient rent-seeking — A Münchhausen solution. Public Choice 75, 43–62 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053880
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053880