Skip to main content
Log in

The peculiar history of scientific reason

  • Articles
  • Published:
Sociological Forum

For Darwin, living means to submit an individual difference to the judgement of the entire congregation of those alive. This judgement includes only two sanctions: either to die, or to become in turn, for a time, part of the jury. But, one is always, for as long as one lives, both judge and judged. (Canguilhem, 1977)

Two people, if they truly wish to understand one another, must have first contradicted one another. Truth is the daughter of debate not of sympathy. (Bachelard, 1953)

Abstract

Science is a social field of forces, struggles, and relationships that is defined at every moment by the relations of power among the protagonists. Scientific choices are guided by taken-for-granted assumptions, interactive with practices, as to what constitutes real and important problems, valid methods, and authentic knowledge. Such choices also are shaped by the social capital controlled by various positions and stances within the field. This complex and dynamic representation thus simultaneously rejects both the absolutist-idealist conception of the immanent development of science and the historicist relativism of those who consider science as purely a conventional social construct. The strategies used in science are at once social and intellectual; for example, strategies that are founded on implicit agreement with the established scientific order are thereby in affinity with the positions of power within the field itself. In established scientific fields of high autonomy, “revolutions” no longer are necessarily at the same time political ruptures but rather are generated within the field themselves: the field becomes the site of a permanent revolution. Under certain conditions, then, strategies used in struggles for symbolic power transcend themselves as they are subjected to the crisscrossing censorship that represents the constitutive reason of the field. The necessary and sufficient condition for this critical correction is a social organization such that each participant can realize specific interest only by mobilizing all the scientific resources available for overcoming the obstacles shared by all his or her competitors. Thus, the type of analysis here illustrated does not lead to reductive bias or sociologism that would undermine its own foundations. Rather it points to a comprehensive and reflexive objectivism that opens up a liberating collective self-analysis.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Bachelard, G. 1953 Le matéralisme rationnel. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

    Google Scholar 

  • 1960 “Roles and innovation in medicine.” American Journal of Sociology 65:557–568.

    Google Scholar 

  • 1971 The Scientist's Role in Society. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ben-David, J. andR. Collins 1966 “Social factors in the origins of a new science: The case of psychology.” American Sociological Review 31:451–465.

    Google Scholar 

  • Borkenan, F. 1934 “Der Uberganag vom feudalen zum Burgerlische Weltbild.” In Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie der Manufakturperiode. Paris: Librairie F. Alcan.

    Google Scholar 

  • 1985 “The market of symbolic goods.” Poetics 14:13–44.

    Google Scholar 

  • 1987a “Fur eine Realpolitik der Vernunft.” In S. Muller-Rolli (ed.), Das Bildungswesen der Zukunft: 229–234. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett.

    Google Scholar 

  • 1987b “The force of law: Toward a sociology of the juridical field.” Hastings Law Journal 38:814–853.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bourdieu, P. forthcoming “The forms of capital.” In Loïc J. D. Wacquant (ed.), Practice, Clan, and Culture: Selected Papers by Pierre Bourdieu. Oxford: Policy Press.

  • Bourdieu, P., J. C. Passeron, andM. De Saint-Martin 1965 Rapport pedagogique et communication. Paris/La Haye: Mouton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Canguilhem, G. 1977 Idéologie et rationalité dans les sciences de la vie. Paris: Vrin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foucault, M. 1968 “Réponse au cercle d'épistemologie.” Cahiers pour analyse 9:9–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacking, I. 1975 The Emergence of Probability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Hagstrom, W. O. 1965 The Scientific Community. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jacob, F. 1970 La logique du vivant. Paris: Gallimard.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koyré, A. 1966 “Perspectives sur l'histoire des sciences” In Etudes d'histoire de la pensée scientifique. Paris:

  • 1962 The Structure of Scientific Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • 1963 “The function of dogma in scientific research.” In A. C. Crombie (ed.), Scientific Change. London: Heineman.

    Google Scholar 

  • 1973 La revolution copernicienne. Paris: Fayard.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sapolsky, H. M. 1966 “Science, voters and the fluoridation controversy.” Science 162:427–433.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shapin, S. andS. Shaffer 1985 Leviathan and the Air-Pump, Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shils, E. 1961 “Center and periphery.” In The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi on His Seventieth Birthday. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • 1968 “Conceptual revolution in science.” In R. S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III:331–337. New York: Humanities Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • 1972 Human Understanding, Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bourdieu, P. The peculiar history of scientific reason. Sociol Forum 6, 3–26 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01112725

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01112725

Key words

Navigation