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The core of an economy with differential information

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Summary

We introduce a new core concept for an exchange economy with differential information which is contained in the coarse core concept of Wilson (1978). We prove the existence of: (i) a core allocation for an exchange economy with differential information and; (ii) an α-core strategy for a game in normal form with differential information.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 61820, Champaign, IL, USA

    Nicholas C. Yannelis

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  1. Nicholas C. Yannelis
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Additional information

On different occasions I have benefited from discussions, comments and suggestions by C.D. Aliprantis, Kim Border, Don Brown, Baskar Chacravorti, Mark Feldman, Leo Hurwicz, Charlie Kahn, John Ledyard, Andreu Mas-Colell, Flavio Menezes, Tom Palfrey, Ed Prescott, Aldo Rustichini, David Schmeidler and Sanjay Srivastava. Mark Feldman and Aldo Rustichini both independently brought to my attention the related work of Wilson (1978). My thanks are extended to all the above individuals as well as to a careful referee. Of course, I am responsible for any remaining shortcomings.

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Yannelis, N.C. The core of an economy with differential information. Econ Theory 1, 183–197 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01211533

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