Summary
A constant scoring rule asks each individual to vote for a given (and constant) number of alternatives and the alternative with the most votes is elected. A sequential constant scoring rule applies this principle in a process of sequential elimination. Constant scoring rules as well as sequential constant scoring rules fail to satisfy Condorcet criteria when individual preferences are unrestricted. The purpose of this paper is to show that, if we assume that preferences are single-peaked, then some constant scoring rules satisfy the Condorcet loser criterion and some sequential constant scoring rules satisfy the Condorcet winner criterion. The results we provide make possible the identification of these rules.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Black, D.: The theory of committees and elections. Cambridge University Press 1958
Condorcet, M. J. A.: Essai sur l'application de L'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. Paris 1785
Fishburn, P. C., Gehrlein, W. V.: Borda's rule, positional voting and Condorcet's simple majority principle. Publ. Choice28, 79–88 (1976)
Gehrlein, W. V.: Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules. Math. Soc. Sci2, 123–130 (1982).
Lepelley, D.: On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser. Math. Soc. Sci.25, 105–116 (1993)
Lepelley, D., Mbih, B.: The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences. Soc. Choice Welfare11, 253–265 (1994)
Moulin, H.: Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox. J. Econ. Theory45, 53–64 (1988)
Niemi, R. G., Wright, J. R.: Voting cycles and the structure of individual preferences. Soc. Choice Welfare4, 173–183 (1987)
Richelson, J. T.: Running off empty: run-off points systems. Publ. Choice35, 457–468 (1980)
Saari, D. G.: Geometry of voting. Springer 1994
Smith, J. H.: Aggregation of preferences with variable electorates. Econometrica41, 1027–1041 (1973).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
I thank Maurice Salles and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. The usual disclaimers apply.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Lepelley, D. Constant scoring rules, condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences. Econ Theory 7, 491–500 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213662
Received:
Revised:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213662