Abstract
The strong point is the point which minimizes the probability that a candidate be defeated in a two-party election. The center of power is the weighted average of voters' positions in a spatial voting game, where the weights are given by Shapley's modified value. We show that, under very general conditions, the strong point and the center of power coincide.
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Owen's research was supported by the National Science Foundation, Grant SES 85-06376.
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Owen, G., Shapley, L.S. Optimal location of candidates in ideological space. Int J Game Theory 18, 339–356 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01254297
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01254297