This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
References
R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler: The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games, in: M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley, and A. W. Tucker (eds.): Advances in Game Theory, Princeton 1964.
S. J. Brams: Game Theory and Politics, New York 1975.
S. J. Brams and P. Affuso: Power and Size: A New Paradox, Theory and Decision7 (1976), pp. 29–56.
S. J. Brams and M. Lake: Power and Satisfaction in a Representative Democracy, in: P. C. Ordeshook (ed.): Game Theory and Political Science. New York 1978.
P. Dubey and L. S. Shapley: Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index, Mathematics of Operations Research4 (1979), pp. 99–131.
J. C. Harsanyi: Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge 1977.
A. D. Horowitz: The Competitive Bargaining Set for Cooperativen-Person Games, Journal of Mathematical Psychology10 (1973), pp. 265–289.
M. Laakso: Valtaindeksien paradoksit (The Paradoxes of Power Indices), Research Reports of the Institute of Political Science. University of Helsinki, Ser. A N49, 1978.
R. McKelvey and R. Smith: Internal Stability and the Size Principle, Manuscript, Pittsburgh: Carnegie-Mellon University, 1974.
J. W. Milnor and L. S. Shapley: Values of Large Games: Oceanic Games, Mathematics of Operations Research3 (1978), pp. 290–307.
C. H. Nevison, B. Zicht, and S. Schoepke: A Naive Approach to the Banzhaf Index of Power, Behavioral Science23 (1978), pp. 130–131.
H. Nurmi: Power and Support, Munich Social Science Review, 1978/4, pp. 5–24.
W. H. Riker and P. C. Ordeshook: An Introduction to Positive Political Theory, Englewood Cliffs 1973.
W. H. Riker and L. S. Shapley: Weighted Voting, in: R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds.): Representation: Nomos X, New York 1968.
A. Roth: The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility, Econometrica45 (1977), pp. 657–664.
N. Schofield (1978 a): Generalised Bargaining Sets for Cooperative Games, International Journal of Game Theory7 (1978), pp. 183–199.
N. Schofield (1978 b): Proof of a Conjecture on the M2-Bargaining Set for a Class of Voting Games without Transferable Value, Manuscript 1978.
N. Z. Shapiro and L. S. Shapley: Values of Large Games I: A Limit Theorem, Mathematics of Operations Research3 (1978), pp. 1–9.
M. Shubik and R. J. Weber: Competitive Valuation of Cooperative Games, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 482, 1978.
P. D. Straffin: Power Indices in Politics, Modules in Applied Mathematics. Ithaca 1976.
P. D. Straffin: Homogeneity, Independence, and Power Indices, Public Choice30 (1977), pp. 107–118.
P. D. Straffin: Probability Models for Power Indices, in: P. C. Ordeshook (ed.): Game Theory and Political Science. New York 1978.
R. J. Weber: Probabilistic Values for Games, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper, No. 471R, September 1978.
H. P. Young (1977 a): Power, Prices, and Incomes in Voting Systems, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, RR-77-5, Laxenburg 1977.
H. P. Young (1977 b): Lobbying and Campaigning with Applications to the Measurement of Power, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, RR-77-13, Laxenburg 1977.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
The author wishes to thank Norman Schofield for helpful discussions on the problematique of this paper as well as for his detailed criticism of an earlier version. Thanks are also due to the referee for a number of suggestions as well as for calling the author's attention to several recent studies on power indices. The first versions of this paper were written during the author's stay as a British Academy Wolfson Fellow at the University of Essex.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Nurmi, H. Game theory and power indices. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 40, 35–58 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01282508
Received:
Revised:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01282508