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For helpful comments, I am grateful to A. Camacho, S. Nitzan, an anonymous referee, and seminar commentators in the Bell Laboratories and Universities of Bonn, Monash, and New South Wales.
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Ng, YK. Beyond pareto optimality: The necessity of interpersonal cardinal utilities in distributional judgements and social choice. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 42, 207–233 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01282907
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01282907