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On some approximately balanced combinatorial cooperative games

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Abstract

A model of taxation for cooperativen-person games is introduced where proper coalitions Are taxed proportionally to their value. Games with non-empty core under taxation at rateɛ-balanced. Sharp bounds onɛ in matching games (not necessarily bipartite) graphs are estabLished. Upper and lower bounds on the smallestɛ in bin packing games are derived and euclidean random TSP games are seen to be, with high probability,ɛ-balanced forɛ≈0.06.

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Faigle, U., Kern, W. On some approximately balanced combinatorial cooperative games. ZOR - Methods and Models of Operations Research 38, 141–152 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01414210

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