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Logrolling, vote trading, and the paradox of voting: A game-theoretical overview

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of Maryland Baltimore County, USA

    Nicholas R. Miller

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  1. Nicholas R. Miller
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Additional information

What follows is a thoroughly revised version of a paper presented at the Public Choice Society meeting, Roanoke, Virginia, April 1976. It has benefited from comments and criticisms from a number of participants at that meeting and from the editorial guidance of Kenneth Shepsle.

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Miller, N.R. Logrolling, vote trading, and the paradox of voting: A game-theoretical overview. Public Choice 30, 51–75 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718818

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