Choice of compulsory insurance schemes under adverse selection

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University of Virginia, USA
William R. Johnson (Assistant Professor of Economics)

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William R. Johnson
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Johnson, W.R. Choice of compulsory insurance schemes under adverse selection. Public Choice 31, 23–35 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01718972

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