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This research was supported by the National Science Foundation.
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Gehrlein, W.V., Fishburn, P.C. Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles. Public Choice 26, 1–18 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01725789
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01725789