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Axioms for expected utility inn-person games

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Abstract

The von Neumann and Morgenstern utility axioms apply to an individual's preferences on a set of probability distributions that is closed under convex linear combinations. However, in a rectangular game situation, the probability distributions on outcomes that correspond to choices of mixed strategies for the players is not generally closed under convex combinations. Axioms are specified for an individual's preference relation on the space of mixed strategies for then players. These axioms are necessary and sufficient for a multilinear expected utility model that reduces to the von Neumann-Morgenstern form. The utility function is unique up to a positive affine transformation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Pennsylvania State University, 310L Business Administration Building, 16802, University Park, Pennsylvania, USA

    P. C. Fishburn

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  1. P. C. Fishburn
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Additional information

This research was supported by the Office of Naval Research (U.S.), Contract N00014-75-C-0857.

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Fishburn, P.C. Axioms for expected utility inn-person games. Int J Game Theory 5, 137–149 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753315

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753315

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