Abstract
The super-additive solution for 2-person Nash bargaining games (with constant threat) was defined axiomatically inPerles/Maschler [1981]. That paper contains also a study of its basic properties. In this paper we show that the axioms are incompatible even for 3-person unanimity games. This raises the problem of finding a satisfactory generalization of this solution concept to multi-person games.
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Perles, M.A. Non-existence of super-additive solutions for 3-person games. Int J Game Theory 11, 151–161 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01755725
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01755725