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The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

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Abstract

We consider a core of a simple game with ordinal preferences on a set of alternative outcomes Ω. When a player's strict preference relation takes any logically possible form of acyclic binary relation on Ω, necessary conditions for a simple game to have a nonempty core are given. If Ω is a finite set, the conditions are also sufficient. Further some related results are obtained.

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  1. Dept. of Humanities and Social Sciences, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Oh-Okayama, Meguro-Ku, Tokyo, Japan

    K. Nakamura

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  1. K. Nakamura
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Nakamura, K. The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences. Int J Game Theory 8, 55–61 (1979). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01763051

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01763051

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