Abstract
A correlated equilibrium in a two-person game is “good” if for everyNash equilibrium there is a player who prefers the correlated equilibrium to theNash equilibrium. If a game is “best-response equivalent” to a two-person zero-sum game, then it has no good correlated equilibria. But games which are “almost strictly competitive” or “order equivalent” to a two-person zero-sum game may have good correlated equilibria.
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Rosenthal, R.W. Correlated equilibria in some classes of two-person games. Int J Game Theory 3, 119–128 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01763252
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01763252