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The domain of constitutional economics

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Abstract

Constitutional political economy is a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules, and institutions within which individuals interact, and the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or come into being. The emphasis on the choice of constraints distinguishes this research program from conventional economics, while the emphasis on cooperative rather than conflictual interaction distinguishes the program from much of conventional political science. Methodological individualism and rational choice may be identified as elements in the hard core of the research program.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, 22030, Fairfax, Va., USA

    James M. Buchanan (Professor)

Authors
  1. James M. Buchanan
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Additional information

Paper prepared for Liberty Fund Symposium on “German Ordnungstheorie and American Constitutional Economics” Bonn, 3–6 June 1989.

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Buchanan, J.M. The domain of constitutional economics. Constit Polit Econ 1, 1–18 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393031

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393031

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