Conclusion
Let us now conclude with a brief summary of the foregoing argument. The paper begins by reiterating that a policy rule can be activist; the distinction between rules and discretion depends upon the stage at which optimization calculations enter the policy process - in the design of a formula (rule) to be implemented each period or in each period’s (discretionary) selection of a policy action. Next, the Kydland-Prescott [1977] example is used to illustrate the tendency for discretionary monetary policy to produce more inflation than would result from a rule, with no additional employment obtained in compensation. Then a specific monetary rule is proposed, one that sets the monetary base - a controllable instrument - each period in a manner designed to keep nominal aggregate demand growing smoothly at a noninflationary rate. Some simple simulations are conducted which suggest that this rule would have worked well in the U.S., over the period 1954-1985, if it had been in effect. The basic idea is that, since economists do not understand how nominal demand changes are divided between inflation and output growth, the most useful thing that monetary policy can accomplish is to keep nominal demand growing smoothly at a noninflationary rate. This can apparently be well achieved by means of a rule such as the one proposed.
Zusammenfassung
Ein Plädoyer für Verhaltensregeln in der Geldpolitik: Ein konkretes Beispiel. - Der Aufsatz unterstreicht zunächst, daß eine Verhaltensregel aktivistisch sein kann, denn die Unterscheidung zwischen regelgebundenen und diskretionären Maßnahmen hängt davon ab, in welchem Stadium Optimierungskalküle in den politischen Prozeß eingebracht werden. Als nächstes wird das Beispiel von Kydland und Prescott benutzt, um zu illustrieren, daß eine diskretionäre Geldpolitik dahin tendiert, mehr Inflation zu erzeugen als eine regelgebundene Politik, und dabei als Kompensation keine zusätzliche Beschäftigung hervorbringt. Das wichtigste Anliegen des Aufsatzes ist es, eine bestimmte geldpolitische Regel vorzuschlagen, nach der in jedem Quartal die monetäre Basis - ein kontrollierbares Instrument - so festgelegt wird, daß die nominale aggregierte Nachfrage gleichmäßig mit einer nichtinflationären Rate expandieren kann. Mit einem einfachen Modell zur BSP-Bestimmung für die USA werden einige Simulationen durchgeführt, die zeigen, daß sich die vorgeschlagene Verhaltensregel - hätte es sie gegeben - in der Zeit zwischen 1954 und 1985 gut bewährt hätte trotz großer unruhestiftender Veränderungen in den Regulierungen und Techniken des Geld- und Kreditsektors.
Résumé
En faveur des règles dans la politique monétaire: un example concret. - L’auteur commence en soulignant qu’une règle de politique peut Être activiste puisque la distinction entre les règles et la discrétion dépend du stade où des calculs d’optimisation entrent dans le processus de politique. Puis il applique l’example de Kydland-Prescott pour illustrer la tendance d’une politique monétaire discrétionaire de produire plus d’inflation qu’on aurait obtenu par une règle, avec pas d’emploi additionnel comme compensation. La majeure contribution est la proposition d’une règle monétaire spécifique qui fixe la base monétaire - un instrument contrÔlable - dans chaque trimestre d’une manière de faire croÎtre la demande nominale agrégée d’un taux non-inflationniste. L’auteur fait quelques simulations avec un simple modèle estimé pour déterminer le PNB des E.U. Ces simulations suggèrent que la règle proposée aurait eu une bonne performance en dépit des perturbances régulateures et technologiques dans le secteur financier pendant la période 1954–1985 si l’on aurait pratiqué cette règle.
Resumen
En favor de normas de conducta para la política monetaria: un ejemplo concreto. - Este trabajo comienza poniendo énfasis en el carácter activo de una norma política. La distinción entre norma y discreción depende de la fase en la cual el cálculo de optimización entra en el proceso político. A continuación se utiliza el ejemplo de KydlandPrescott para ilustrar la tendencia por parte de la política monetaria discrecionaria de resultar en máss inflación que la que resultaría de una norma, sin generar empleo adicional como compensación. La característica fundamental del trabajo es la proposición de una regla monetaria específica, una que determina la base monetaria - un instrumenta controlable - en cada trimestre, diseñada del tal modo que la demanda agregada nominal continÚe creciendo moderadamente a una tasa no inflacionaria. Se llevan a cabo algunas simulaciones con un modelo simple de determinación del PBI de los EE UU. Estas simulaciones sugieren que la regla propuesta pudo haber funcionado con éxito en el periodo 1954–1985 si hubiera estado vigente, a pesar de la agitación regulatoria y tecnológica a la que ha sido sometida el sector financiero.
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McCallum, B.T. The case for rules in the conduct of monetary policy: A concrete example. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 123, 415–429 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02707752
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02707752