Abstract
Other than standard election disruptions involving shenanigans, strategic voting, and so forth, it is reasonable to expect that elections are free from difficulties. But this is far from being true; even sincere election outcomes admit all sorts of counterintuitive conclusions.
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Saari, D.G., Barney, S. Consequences of reversing preferences. The Mathematical Intelligencer 25, 17–31 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02984858
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02984858