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An assessment of the effectiveness of the monetary dialogue on the ECB’s accountability and transparency: A qualitative approach

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Intereconomics

Abstract

The European Central Bank has been seen by some observers as lacking transparency and accountability. The following article examines whether the monetary dialogue between the European Pariliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) influences the ECB’s behaviour in this regard. This is done by comparing the issues raised by the ECON and its panel of experts and the changes in the ECB’s procedures and arrangements.

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References

  1. These other tasks are: to conduct foreign exchange operations consistent with the provisions of Article 111 (ex Article 109) of the Maastricht Treaty; to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the member states and to promote the smooth operation of payment systems (European Central Bank: The Monetary Policy of the ECB, Frankfurt 2004).

  2. These criteria were constructed using S. C. W. Eijffinger, P. M. Geraats: How Transparent are Central Banks?, CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 3188, 2002.

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  40. See for example L. E. O. Svensson: What is Good and What is Bad With the Eurosystem’s Published Forecasts and How Can They be Improved?, Briefing paper for the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, 2001.

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  45. Regarding this part we have benefited a lot from suggestions by Charles Wyplosz (see C. Wyplosz: Monetary Dialogue of 12 September 2001, 2001).

  46. This interesting point is mentioned in S. Hämäläinen, op. cit. The ECB’s Monetary Policy — Accountability, Transparency and Communication, speech, 14 September 2001.

  47. Unless Milton Friedman was right when he remarked that “from revealed preference, I suspect that by far and away two most important variables in their (central bankers) loss function are avoiding accountability on the one hand and achieving public prestige on the other” (quoted in I. J. M. Arnold: Empirical Essays in Monetary Economics, dissertation Erasmus University Rotterdam, 1995).

  48. P. Maier: The Impact of Politics on Monetary Policy: A Study of the Bundesbank and Other Central Banks, Thesis, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2001, Labyrint Publication.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. CentER for Economic Research and Department of Economics, Filburg University, The Netherlands

    Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger

  2. CEPR, London, UK

    Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger

  3. Utrecht, The Netherlands

    Edin Mujagic

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  1. Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
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  2. Edin Mujagic
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Eijffinger, S.C.W., Mujagic, E. An assessment of the effectiveness of the monetary dialogue on the ECB’s accountability and transparency: A qualitative approach. Intereconomics 39, 190–203 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03032110

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