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Making IBM’s computer, Watson, human

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Abstract

This essay uses the recent victory of an IBM computer (Watson) in the TV game, Jeopardy, to speculate on the abilities Watson would need, in addition to those it has, to be human. The essay’s basic premise is that to be human is to behave as humans behave and to function in society as humans function. Alternatives to this premise are considered and rejected. The viewpoint of the essay is that of teleological behaviorism. Mental states are defined as temporally extended patterns of overt behavior. From this viewpoint (although Watson does not currently have them), essential human attributes such as consciousness, the ability to love, to feel pain, to sense, to perceive, and to imagine may all be possessed by a computer. Most crucially, a computer may possess self-control and may act altruistically. However, the computer’s appearance, its ability to make specific movements, its possession of particular internal structures (e.g., whether those structures are organic or inorganic), and the presence of any nonmaterial “self,” are all incidental to its humanity.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Psychology Department, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, New York, 11794, USA

    Howard Rachlin

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  1. Howard Rachlin
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Correspondence to Howard Rachlin.

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Preparation of this article was supported by Grant DA02652021 from the National Institute of Drug Abuse. The content is solely the responsibility of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the National Institutes of Health.

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Rachlin, H. Making IBM’s computer, Watson, human. BEHAV ANALYST 35, 1–16 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03392260

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