Abstract
We study the existence of Nash equilibria in games with an infinite number of players. We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies in all normal form games such that pure strategy sets are compact metric spaces and utility functions are continuous. The player set can be any nonempty set.
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This paper was presented in the Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory in Sevilla 2002.
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Salonen, H. On the existence of Nash equilibria in large games. Int J Game Theory 39, 351–357 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0180-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0180-7