Abstract
We investigate the implications and logical relations between progressivity (a principle of distributive justice) and merging-proofness (a strategic principle) in taxation. By means of two characterization results, we show that these two principles are intimately related, despite their different nature. In particular, we show that, in the presence of continuity and consistency (a widely accepted framework for taxation) progressivity implies merging-proofness and that the converse implication holds if we add an additional strategic principle extending the scope of merging-proofness to a multilateral setting. By considering operators on the space of taxation rules, we also show that progressivity is slightly more robust than merging-proofness.
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Ju, BG., Moreno-Ternero, J.D. Progressive and merging-proof taxation. Int J Game Theory 40, 43–62 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0228-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0228-8