Abstract.
This paper considers the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced cooperative game as a solution concept. It is shown that the Lorenz-solution concept satisfies a number of suitable properties such as desirability, continuity and the reduced game property. Moreover, the paper consideres alternative characterizations where it is shown that Lorenz-fairness is tantamount to the existence of an additive, strictly increasing and concave social welfare function. Finally the paper also provides axiomatic characterizations as well as two examples of application.
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Received: February 1999/Final version: June 2001
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Hougaard, J., Peleg, B. & Thorlund-Petersen, L. On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game. Game Theory 30, 147–165 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100070
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100070