Abstract
On the domain of convex games, many desirable properties of solutions are compatible and there are many single-valued solutions that are intuitively appealing. We establish some interesting logical relations among properties of single-valued solutions. In particular, we introduce a new property, weak contribution-monotonicity, and show that this property is a key property that links other properties such as population-monotonicity, max consistency, converse max consistency, and dummy-player-out.
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Received: July 2002/Revised: March 2003
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Hokari, T., van Gellekom, A. Population monotonicity and consistency in convex games: Some logical relations. Int J Game Theory 31, 593–607 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300141
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300141