Summary.
We consider the problem of choosing one point in a set of alternatives when monetary transfers are possible. In this context, Schummer (2000) shows that a social choice function must be a constant function if manipulation through bribes is ruled out. But he requires two kinds of domain-richness conditions. One is either smooth connectedness or the finiteness of the set of alternatives and the other is monotonical closedness. However, dispensing with the former condition, we alternatively prove the same result under a weaker condition than monotonical closedness.
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Received: April 11, 2000; revised version: February 25, 2002
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ID="*" This paper received the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Moriguchi Prize in January 2001. I am grateful to Prof. Ryoichi Nagahisa, Prof. Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Prof. Ken-ichi Shimomura, Prof. Ken Urai, and especially two anonymous referees for their useful and helpful comments and suggestions. I am a Research Fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.
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Mizukami, H. On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions. Econ Theory 22, 211–217 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0267-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0267-x