Summary.
We consider a set-up in which firms sequentially adopt a technology. The technology is a public good. Late movers, upon observing the early movers adopting the old technology, (partly) infer that the new technology does not exist. This hampers their incentives to innovate. Early movers anticipate this and rather exert effort to try to invent the new technology. Hence, in our model herding reduces free-rider problems and may - in the presence of switching costs - even increase efficiency.
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Received: 20 June 2002, Revised: 26 May 2004,
JEL Classification Numbers:
D83, D82, D62.
I am very grateful to my thesis advisor Mathias Dewatripont for his many helpful suggestions. I thank seminar participants at ECARES, DELTA, IAE, GREMAQ and WZB. I also benefited from comments made by A.Banerjee, P.Bolton, M.Castanheira, J.Gyntelberg, P.Legros, G.Roland, M.Ruckes, X.Vives, J.Zwiebel and an anonymous referee. I gratefully acknowledge financial assistance provided by the European Commission through its TMR program (Contract number FMRX-CT98-0203) and from the Inter University Poles of Attraction Program (Contract PAI P4/28). Finally, I am also very grateful to M.Castanheira for his many encouragements at the start of my research work.
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Melissas, N. Herd behaviour as an incentive scheme. Economic Theory 26, 517–536 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0530-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0530-4