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Revision of conjectures about the opponent’s utilities in signaling games

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Abstract

In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in Perea (2005) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of sequential equilibrium

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200, MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Tim Schulteis, Andres Perea, Hans Peters & Dries Vermeulen

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  1. Tim Schulteis
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  2. Andres Perea
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  3. Hans Peters
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  4. Dries Vermeulen
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hans Peters.

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Schulteis, T., Perea, A., Peters, H. et al. Revision of conjectures about the opponent’s utilities in signaling games. Economic Theory 30, 373–384 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0061-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0061-7

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