Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Fair social orderings

  • Research Article
  • Published:
Economic Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Arrow K.J. (1963) Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd edn. Wiley, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell D.E., Kelly J.S. (2000) Information and preference aggregation. Soc Choice Welf 17, 3–24

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • d’Aspremont C., Gevers L. (1977) Equity and the informational basis of collective choice. Rev Econ Stud 44, 199–209

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fleming M. (1952) A cardinal concept of welfare. Quart J Econ 66, 366–384

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fleurbaey M., Maniquet F. (2006). Utilitarianism versus fairness in welfare economics. In: Salles M., Weymark J.A. (eds). Justice, Political Liberalism and Utilitarianism: themes from Harsanyi and Rawls. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (forthcoming)

    Google Scholar 

  • Fleurbaey, M., Maniquet, F. Fair social orderings. Mimeo, U. of Pau and U. of Namur (2004)

  • Fleurbaey M., Suzumura K., Tadenuma K. (2005) Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?. J Econ Theory 124, 22–44

    Google Scholar 

  • Gevers L. (1986). Walrasian Social Choice: some simple axiomatic approaches. In: Heller W., et al. (eds). Social Choice and Public Decision Making. Essays in Honor of K.J. Arrow. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodin R.E. (1986). Laundering preferences. In: Elster J., Hylland A. (eds). Foundations of Social Choice Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Hammond P.J. (1976) Equity, Arrow’s conditions and Rawls’ difference principle. Econometrica 44, 793–804

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hansson B. (1973) The independence condition in the theory of social choice. Theory Decis 4, 25–49

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maskin E. (1999) Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Rev Econ Stud 66, 23–38

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moulin H., Thomson W. (1997). Axiomatic analysis of resource allocation problems. In: Arrow K.J., Sen A., Suzumura K. (eds). Social Choice Re-examined, vol. 1. London: Macmillan and New-York: St. Martin’s Press

  • Pazner, E. Equity, nonfeasible alternatives and social choice: a reconsideration of the concept of social welfare. In: Laffont, J.J., (ed.) Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. Amsterdam: North-Holland (1979)

  • Pazner E., Schmeidler D. (1978) Egalitarian equivalent allocations: a new concept of economic equity. Quart J Econ 92, 671–687

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Samuelson P.A. (1987). Sparks from Arrow’s Anvil. In: Feiwel G.E. (eds). Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy. New York University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Sprumont Y., Zhou L. (1999) Pazner–Schmeidler Rules in large societies. J Math Econ 31, 321–339

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Steinhaus H. (1948) The Problem of Fair Division. Econometrica 16, 101–104

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomson W. (1983) The fair division of a fixed supply among a growing population. Math Oper Res 8, 319–326

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thomson W. Consistent allocation rules. Working Paper 137, Rochester Center for Economic Research, University of Rochester (1996)

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. CNRS, University Paris 5 and IDEP. CERSES, 45 rue des Sts Pères, 75270, Paris Cedex 6, France

    M. Fleurbaey

  2. CORE and University of Louvain-la-Neuve, CORE, Voie du Roman Pays, 34, 1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    F. Maniquet

Authors
  1. M. Fleurbaey
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. F. Maniquet
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to M. Fleurbaey.

Additional information

We thank E. Maskin, A. Sen, W. Thomson, B. Tungodden and an anonymous referee for comments, and seminar participants at the Indian Statistical Institute-Delhi, the Norwegian School of Economics (Bergen), the University of Caen, the University of Rochester, and the University of Cergy-Pontoise. Financial Support from European TMR Network Living Standards, Inequality and Taxation Contract ERBFMXCT 980248 is gratefully acknowledged.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Fleurbaey, M., Maniquet, F. Fair social orderings. Economic Theory 34, 25–45 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0132-4

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0132-4

Keywords

JEL Classification Numbers

Search

Navigation