Abstract
Auction theory usually assumes the quasi-linearity of individual preferences. We drop this assumption and define an extension of second price mechanisms that applies to general preferences. It turns out that the extended second price mechanisms are the only rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and a mild non-imposition property. Their definition is simple just as much as the definition of usual second price mechanisms: everyone reports his maximum willingness to pay and the bidder whose reported value is highest buys the auctioned object for the price equal to the second highest reported value. The characterization is valid if efficiency is replaced by envy-freeness.
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I gratefully acknowledge an associate editor and two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments. Hiroki Saitoh and Shigehiro Serizawa independently obtain a result that is closely related to my main result (see, Remark in Sect. 1). I thank them for sending me the paper and communication, and Yuji Fujinaka for informing me about their work. I also thank the financial support by KAKENHI (19310031).
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Sakai, T. Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations. Econ Theory 37, 347–356 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0311-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0311-y