Abstract
We develop a theory of a multinational corporation’s optimal mode of entry in a new market. The foreign firm can choose between a licensing agreement, a wholly owned subsidiary or shared control (joint venture). In an environment in which property rights are insecure, opportunism is possible, and the identification of new business opportunities is costly, we show that the relationship between the quality of the institutional environment and the mode of entry decision is non-monotonic. Licensing is preferred if property rights are strictly enforced, while a joint venture is chosen when property rights are poorly enforced. For intermediate situations, the better use of local knowledge made possible by shared control under a joint venture works as a double edged sword. On the one hand, it makes the monitoring activity of the multinational more credible, on the other it offers insurance to both parties, potentially compromising the incentives faced by the local partner.
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We are grateful to the Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano for providing financial support. For useful comments we would like to thank Klaus Desmet, Cecilia Testa, Henry Wan and Gerald Willmann and seminar participants at Cornell, Ente Luigi Einaudi, Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Kiel, Milano, Universidad de Sao Paolo, the Midwest International Economics Meetings in Indianapolis, SAET VI conference in Rhodes, and the City University of Hong Kong Conference on Intellectual Property Rights.
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Che, J., Facchini, G. Cultural differences, insecure property rights and the mode of entry decision. Econ Theory 38, 465–484 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0323-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0323-7