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Core and equilibria under ambiguity

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Abstract

This paper introduces new core and Walrasian equilibrium notions for an asymmetric information economy with non-expected utility preferences. We prove existence and incentive compatibility results for the notions we introduce. We also discuss a framework for ex ante, interim and ex post preferences.

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Correspondence to Luciano I. de Castro.

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We are grateful to Monique Florenzano, Maria Gabriella Graziano and Fabio Maccheroni for very helpful comments.

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de Castro, L.I., Pesce, M. & Yannelis, N.C. Core and equilibria under ambiguity. Econ Theory 48, 519–548 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0637-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0637-3

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