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An analysis of the German university admissions system

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the sequential admissions procedure for medical subjects at public universities in Germany. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be characterized by a stability condition that is adapted to the institutional constraints of the German system. I introduce matching problems with complex constraints and the notion of procedural stability. Two simple assumptions guarantee existence of a student optimal procedurally stable matching mechanism that is strategyproof for students. In the context of the German admissions problem, this mechanism weakly Pareto dominates all equilibrium outcomes of the currently employed procedure. Applications to school choice with affirmative action are also discussed.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Microeconomics, University of Bonn, Lennestr. 37, 53113, Bonn, Germany

    Alexander Westkamp

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  1. Alexander Westkamp
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Correspondence to Alexander Westkamp.

Additional information

This paper previously circulated under the title “Failures in the German College Admissions System.” I thank Benny Moldovanu for continuous guidance and support during this project. I have also greatly benefitted from discussions with and comments from Al Roth. The editor and two anonymous referees provided very helpful suggestions for improving the quality of this paper. I would like to thank Peter Coles, Lars Ehlers, Fuhito Kojima, and Konrad Mierendorff for their insightful comments and suggestions. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) and the Deutscher Akademischer Auslandsdienst (DAAD) is gratefully acknowledged.

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Westkamp, A. An analysis of the German university admissions system. Econ Theory 53, 561–589 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0704-4

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