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Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies

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Summary.

We introduce several efficiency notions depending on what kind of expected utility is used (ex ante, interim, ex post) and on how agents share their private information, i.e., whether they redistribute their initial endowments based on their own private information, or common knowledge information, or pooled information. Moreover, we introduce several Bayesian incentive compatibility notions and identify several efficiency concepts which maintain (coalitional) Bayesian incentive compatibility.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820, USA, , , , , , US

    Guangsug Hahn & Nicholas C. Yannelis

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  1. Guangsug Hahn
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  2. Nicholas C. Yannelis
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Received: March 25, 1996; revised September 5, 1996

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Hahn, G., Yannelis, N. Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies. Economic Theory 10, 383–411 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050164

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050164

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