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Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices

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Summary.

Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria for the uniform price auction.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois, Urbana, Champaign, IL 61820, USA, , , , , , US

    Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

  2. Department of Finance, University of Illinois, Urbana, Champaign, IL 61820, USA, , , , , , US

    Charles M. Kahn

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  1. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
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  2. Charles M. Kahn
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Received: July 31, 1995; revised version: May 28, 1997

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Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Kahn, C. Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices. Economic Theory 12, 227–258 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050220

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050220

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