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A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations

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Summary.

We present a family of mechanisms which implement Lindahl allocations in Nash equilibrium. With quasilinear utility functions this family of mechanisms are supermodular games, which implies that they converge to Nash equilibrium under a wide class of learning dynamics.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220, USA (e-mail: yanchen@umich.edu) , , , , , , US

    Yan Chen

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  1. Yan Chen
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Received: April 27, 2000; revised version: January 16, 2001

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Chen, Y. A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations. Econ Theory 19, 773–790 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100174

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100174

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