Abstract
The paper by Ghosh and Saha (Econ Theory 30:575–586, 2007) shows that entry can be socially excessive even if there are no scale economies. We show that exogenous cost asymmetry is responsible for this result. In a simple model with R&D investment by the more cost efficient firm, thus creating endogenous cost asymmetry, we show that entry is socially insufficient instead of excessive if the slope of the marginal cost of R&D is not very high.
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Mukherjee, A. Endogenous cost asymmetry and insufficient entry in the absence of scale economies. J Econ 106, 75–82 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0255-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0255-3