Abstract.
The paper studies Downsian electoral competition in the framework of redistributive politics among groups of unequal size. As soon as no group forms a majority on its own, parties treat all voters in the same way at an equilibrium of the Plurality game.
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This paper has benefited a lot from the referees' careful reading. I also thank for their comments Steve Brams and other seminar participants in Caen and Paris. All remaining errors are mine.
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Laslier, JF. How two-party competition treats minorities. Rev Econ Design 7, 297–307 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200083
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200083