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China’s silk road economic belt initiative in Central Asia: economic and security implications

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Abstract

The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) initiative, launched by Xi Jinping in 2013 as the Central Asian component of the Eurasian Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is presented as a trade and infrastructural developmental initiative that benefits all to deliver stability. It consolidates Beijing’s existing economic investments and security-building measures, while launching new projects to link the regions of Central Asia and South Asia more closely with China and extend the arc of security westward and develop these as a transport corridor linking China to Europe. This article examines the interaction between China’s infrastructural investments and security dynamics in the Central Asian region, exploring why the BRI/SREB, presented by China as primarily as a developmental vision, is fraught with wide-ranging security implications. We examine the reception of China’s BRI/SREB in Central Asia focusing on the following three dimensions: (1) the lure of Chinese investments which makes SREB particularly attractive for Central Asian countries; (2) the securitization thrust of the Silk Road initiative which consolidates the power of the Central Asian regimes but also grants considerable role to China in managing security arrangements; (3) elite maneuvering between the lure of Chinese investments and appeasing popular anxieties about China’s growing influence. It points to the overall positive reception in the region to the aid and investment offered by China, while noting the variance in their responses based on the implications of SREB for their sovereignty and security and also concerns on whether the promised benefits of connectivity and development (a “win-win” scenario) will materialize. The article concludes by outlining the implications of China’s rising economic and security engagement in Central Asia and the close Sino-Russian partnership for European financial and security interests and highlights the areas of cooperation and complementarity between China and EU in the region.

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Notes

  1. China’s developmental goals in the BRI and “China Dream“ have both economic and security elements; however, the externally projected BRI is primarily an economic/development initiative with “win-win” solutions for the countries involved (Xi 2014, 2016).

  2. Where available, primary and secondary sources were used to triangulate the findings from fieldwork.

  3. These Chinese ideals are found policies such as Zhu Rongji’s “Develop the West” Initiative predating the BRI. The importance of Xinjiang is evident in details of the CPEC (Hussain 2017).

  4. The Khorgos dry port was formally launched in 2011 although construction predates this.

  5. The remote and landlocked Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region in Western China bordering the Central Asian region has been amongst China’s most underdeveloped provinces. The Uyghurs had constituted a majority in the region until 2010, and together with ethnic Kazakhs constitute Turkophone Muslim groups distinct from Han Chinese (NBS 2013). The East Turkistan Independence movement, which gained momentum after the independence of the Central Asian Republics, garners support from kinship-based links with Uyghurs in neighboring Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, as well as in Turkey.

  6. China is a major stakeholder in Afghanistan’s stabilization and development alongside the US, Russia and India.

  7. In their analysis of perceptions of China in Kazakhstani media Burkhanov and Chen (2016) note that Kazakh language press, which has a wider readership in rural regions, tends to reveal much greater levels of Sinophobia as it propounds nationalist sentiments. Similarly, the numerous anti-China mobilizations in Kyrgyzstan have occurred in rural settings, mobilized by nationalist opposition leaders.

  8. The proposed land reform bill was an attempt to introduce much needed changes to the 2003 Land Code, with many complex features, but it was presented by protestors as being designed to enable the Chinese to acquire a long-term control over Kazakhstan’s land.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. SOAS University of London, London, UK

    Bhavna Dave & Yuka Kobayashi

Authors
  1. Bhavna Dave
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  2. Yuka Kobayashi
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Correspondence to Bhavna Dave.

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The authors would like to acknowledge Peter Morton for his editorial assistance.

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Dave, B., Kobayashi, Y. China’s silk road economic belt initiative in Central Asia: economic and security implications. Asia Eur J 16, 267–281 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-018-0513-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-018-0513-x

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