Abstract
We revisit some concepts of superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games with continuous strategy space. We prove a general stability result for replicator trajectories by introducing the concept of superiority with respect to a given closed set. Some important results in the literature regarding weak stability turn out to be special cases of our main result.
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We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for carefully reading the manuscript and providing their valuable comments and suggestions to improve it.
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Hingu, D., Mallikarjuna Rao, K.S. & Shaiju, A.J. On superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games. Ann Oper Res 287, 751–760 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-018-2971-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-018-2971-3