Rationality, Reasonableness, and Critical Rationalism: Problems with the Pragma-dialectical View

The most recent systematic statement of the view is van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), on which this discussion is based. All references in the text to these authors are to that book.

We articulate and defend the epistemic view in Biro and Siegel (1992), (2006) and (2006a), and Siegel and Biro (1997).

Argumentation is, on this view, “instrumental,” aimed at “achieving a certain goal”, namely, that of “justify[ing] or refut[ing] a proposition...defend[ing] a standpoint in such a way that the other party is convinced of its acceptability.” (2004, p. 3; cf. p. 12: argumentation “aims to convince a reasonable critic of a certain standpoint.”) Since this is the goal of the activity, argumentative quality on the pragma-dialectical view is a matter of a given bit of argumentation’s achieving this goal. This seems to us a mistaken way of conceiving of argumentative quality. First, a party, even a reasonable one, can be erroneously convinced of the acceptability or otherwise of a standpoint. Second, and more importantly, an argument’s quality, i.e., its ability to ‘justify or refute a proposition,’ is independent of the reaction (becoming convinced or otherwise) of those who hear or read it. Having argued for these points in the papers cited in the previous footnote, we will not pursue the matter here.

Further examples which demonstrate how the relevant sort of normativity, i.e., epistemic normativity, fails to track the pragma-dialectical rules and ‘dialectical reasonableness’ are given in Biro and Siegel (1992), pp. 89–91.

The previous two paragraphs are taken, with changes, from Biro and Siegel (2006), pp. 6–7.

By ‘adequate’ we mean sufficient to yield knowledge or justified belief, where what is sufficient depends, of course, on subject matter, purpose, and circumstance. For reasons of both space and expertise, we limit our discussion to the Popperian version of critical rationalism.

It is perhaps worth pointing out that this understanding of ‘justificationism’ as rejecting positive support altogether is not only endorsed by Popper consistently throughout his many writings, it grows increasingly radical as time goes on, as the final citation makes clear.

The charge that Popper’s position has a ‘whiff of inductivism’ about it was made by Lakatos (1974, pp. 256–263). Popper grudgingly acknowledges the point in his reply to Ayer: “In spite of this, there may be a ‘whiff’ of inductivism here. It enters with the vague realist assumption that reality, though unknown, is in some respects similar to what science tells us or, in other words, with the assumption that science can progress towards greater verisimilitude.” (Popper 1974, p. 1193, note 165b) Newton-Smith remarks of this passage that “it is just false to say that there is a whiff of inductivism here—there is a full-blown storm.” (Newton-Smith 1981, p. 68; cf. pp. 66–70) O’Hear says of it that “It is not surprising that some commentators have seen this passage as an enormous concession by Popper to his critics.” (O’Hear 1980, p. 67) Putnam also “detect[s] an inductivist quaver” in Popper’s writings (Putnam 1974, p. 224).

We strongly endorse Oddie’s (1996) positive case for the existence and epistemic significance of objectively good reasons, and his devastating critique of (Miller’s version of) critical rationalism.

There are actually three trilemmas in play here that should be distinguished. In his classic The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), Popper discusses ‘Freis’ Trilemma’ (FT), according to which the requirement of positive justification ends in dogmatism, infinite regress, or psychologism, by which Popper means justification by immediate sense experience (1959, pp. 93–105). Popper rejects the latter as being of a piece with induction, which, of course, he also rejects; he ‘resolves’ FT by rejecting the possibility of positive justification and urging that our preference for corroborated theories be seen in terms of decision rather than justification (1959, pp. 106–111). But this resolution fails for the reasons given above. Another Trilemma is that of Agrippa. Agrippa’s Trilemma (AT) has it that justification ends in infinite regress, circularity, or dogmatic assumption (Williams 1999, pp. 38–41). AT is very nearly equivalent to MT: the former’s third possibility is dogmatism; the latter’s is arbitrariness. (They are equivalent if a dogmatic assumption is always an arbitrary stopping point. Williams articulates AT in both ways: in terms of dogmatic assumption in Williams (1999), p. 39; and in terms of arbitrariness in Williams (2005), pp. 205.) Our example in the text below (Cheney’s news conference) is meant to avoid both arbitrariness and dogmatic assumption. But as we try to make clear in the text, we do not offer it as a resolution of the ancient problem of the structure (or regress) of justification. Addressing that problem is beyond the scope of this paper. (See Siegel 1997, ch. 5, for a resolution that rests on ‘self-reflexive’ justification or ‘self-justification.’ Thanks to Liz Giles for helpful discussion of AT.)

For further discussion of this resolution see Siegel (1997), ch. 8.

It is worth noting that our proposed resolution bears a striking resemblance to Popper’s own solution to ‘Freis’s Trilemma’ concerning the status of ‘basic statements.’ Cf. Popper (1959), p. 105.

It may be thought that our argument commits us to just such a premise: namely, that reasons can afford justification and that we therefore ought to reason in accordance with them. A justification of this premise, in the form of an answer to the question ‘Why be rational?,’ is offered in Siegel (1997), ch. 5.

See references in note 2 above.

As suggested by one of the reviewers. We wish to thank the reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.